Publications

Forthcoming

The Means and Ends of Habitual Action

Berthelette, S. & Kalbach, C. - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Not All Who Ponder Count Costs: Arithmetic Reflection Predicts Utilitarian Tendencies, but Logical Reflection Predicts both Deontological and Utilitarian Tendencies

Nick Byrd & Paul Conway- forthcoming - Cognition

Heuristics and the Naturalistic Fallacy

Kalbach, C. - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Teleological Essentialism

Rose, D. & Nichols, S. - forthcoming - Cognitive Science

What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments

Byrd, N. - Forthcoming - Synthese

On snubbing proximal intentions

Mele, A. - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies 

Folk teleology drives persistence judgments

Rose, D., Schaffer, J., & Tobia, K. P. - forthcoming - Synthese

Nothing at stake in knowledge

Rose, D., Machery, E., Stich, S., et al. - forthcoming - Noûs

2018

The Crucial But Underrepresented Role of Philosophy in Conservation Biology Curricula

Saltz, D., Justus, J., & Huffake, B. - 2018 - Conservation Biology

Agency enhancement and social psychology

Taylor, M. - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Commentary)

Ordinary People Think Free Will Is a Lack of Constraint, Not the Presence of a Soul

Vonasch, A., Baumeister, R. and Mele, A. - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition

2017

Folk intuitions of actual causation: a two-pronged debunking explanation

Rose, D. - 2017 - Philosophical Studies, 174(5), 1323-1361.

Folk mereology is teleological

Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. - 2017 - Noûs, 51(2), 238-270.

Gettier Across Cultures

Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., et al. - 2017 - Noûs, 51(3), 645-664.

2000-2015

Belief is prior to knowledge

Rose, D. - 2015 - Episteme, 12(3), 385-399.

Belief through thick and thin

Buckwalter, W., Rose, D., & Turri, J. - 2015 - Noûs, 49(4), 748-775.

Persistence through function preservation

Rose, D. - 2015 - Synthese, 192(1), 97-146.

Demoralizing causation

Danks, D., Rose, D., & Machery, E. - 2014 - Philosophical Studies, 171(2), 251-277.

X-Phi and Carnapian Explication

Shepherd, J. & Justus, J. - 2014 - Erkenn, 80, 381–402

Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. - 2013 - Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 19-50

Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action

Mele, A. - 2012 - Philosophical Issues, 22, 281-297.

Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions

Stillman, T., Baumeister, R., and Mele, A. - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology, 24, 381-394.

Causation, norm violation, and culpable control

Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. - 2011 - The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670-696.

Weakness of Will and Akrasia

Mele, A. - 2010 - Philosophical Studies, 150, 391-404.

Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company

Mele, A. - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 745-750.

Intentional Action: Two-and-a-half Folk Concepts

Cushman, F., and Mele, A. - 2008 - in J. Knobe and S. Nichols, eds. Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press,2008, 171-188.

Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses

Mele, A. - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology, 16, 325-340.

Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions

Mele, A. - 2001 - in B. Malle, L. Moses, and D. Baldwin, eds. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, 27-43.

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